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Incarceration of the Free Exercise Clause: The Sixth 
Circuit’s Misstep in Cutter v. Wilkinson 
 
[T]he holy author of our religion, who being lord both of body and 
mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either . . . but to 
exalt it by its influence on reason alone; [as compared with] . . . the 
impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as 
ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, 
have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own 
opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as 
such endeavoring to impose them on others . . . .1
 
– Thomas Jefferson 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RLUIPA 
 
Thomas Jefferson’s quote reflects a dichotomy that is characteristic 
of many of the Constitutional Founders: a strong faith punctuated by a 
determined desire to face God in their own way free of the fetters of a 
state religion. The First Amendment embodies this duality and gives it 
expression through the competing interests of the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses. Yet, the passage of the First Amendment did not end 
the tension between protection of religious liberties and the threat of 
government-established religion. Instead, that pronouncement ushered in 
a judicial and legislative balancing act of these religion clauses that has 
continued since the Founding. Recently this balancing act resulted in 
passage of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act 
(“RLUIPA”) and a circuit split with the decision of the Sixth Circuit in 
Cutter v. Wilkinson declaring RLUIPA unconstitutional.2
When introducing the bill that became RLUIPA, co-sponsors 
Senators Hatch and Kennedy stated, “Far more than any other 
Americans, persons residing in institutions are subject to the authority of 
one or a few local officials.”3 In this setting, “[i]t is well known that 
prisoners often file frivolous claims; it is less well known that prison 
 1. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (June 12, 1779), reprinted 
in, 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 77 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Learner eds., 1987). 
 2. 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 3. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
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officials sometimes impose frivolous or arbitrary rules” many of which 
unjustifiably burden prisoners’ religious freedoms.4 As a result of years 
of hearings regarding prisoner’s religious freedoms Congress concluded 
some additional legal protection was required to protect institutionalized 
persons’ religious liberty from being restricted in “egregious and 
unnecessary ways.”5 RLUIPA is its most recent solution.6
RLUIPA is a federal act passed in 2000 in response to the demise of 
its predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in City 
of Boerne v. Flores, paired with the perception that institutionalized 
persons need additional protection of their religious rights from 
governmental infringement.7 RLUIPA’s section three specifically applies 
to governmental regulations that burden institutionalized persons’ 
exercise of religion.8 Accordingly, RLUIPA was one of the basis relied 
upon by plaintiffs in Cutter v. Wilkinson.9 This case consolidated three 
Ohio prisoners’ challenges to prison regulations that impinged upon the 
exercise of their respective religious beliefs.10 While not admitting 
liability under RLUIPA the state of Ohio responded in Cutter by arguing 
that, first, it was not violating RLUIPA and that, second, even if it is 
violating RLUIPA, the Act is unconstitutional.11
As a result, the Sixth Circuit in Cutter addressed the constitutionality 
of RLUIPA under the Establishment Clause and determined that it was 
unconstitutional.12 This decision merits close attention because it stands 
with only two district courts against an “apparent juggernaut of circuit 
and district court opinions” that specifically uphold RLUIPA or RFRA’s 
First Amendment constitutionality.13 Furthermore, the Cutter court’s 
decision warrants close attention because RLUIPA introduces an 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). Boerne found RFRA unconstitutional for federalism 
concerns. Id. at 515-16. Both RFRA and RLUIPA utilize strict scrutiny in evaluating neutral 
government laws that incidentally burden religious exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (2004); 
146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. 
Kennedy). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1 (2004) (also held unconstitutional by Al Ghashiyah v. 
Dep’t of Corr. 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003)). 
 9. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 10. 349 F.3d 257, 259 (6th Cir. 2003). The three cases were combined for circuit court 
review because they each hinged on the constitutionality of RLUIPA. Id. at 259-60. 
 11. Id. at 264-67 (specifically finding it has the impermissible effect of promoting religious 
exercise as more fully described infra Part V.B discussion of the effects prong). 
 12. Id. at 268-69. In contrast to Boerne in which the Court addressed federalism concerns for 
RFRA, the Sixth Circuit found it unnecessary to address federalism concerns and limited its analysis 
to the Establishment Clause. 
 13. Id. at 262. (citing the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits as finding either RFRA 
or RLUIPA constitutional). 
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appreciable risk of impermissible governmental support of religion—yet 
without RLUIPA, there is a risk for significant erosion of protection for 
religious expression by institutionalized persons. 
Although the prisoners’ suit extends beyond RLUIPA based claims 
this Note limits its analysis to the Cutter court’s rationale under the 
Establishment Clause. This narrow focus seems appropriate given that 
the Establishment Clause is the only issue over which the district and 
circuit courts are in direct conflict and is the only issue addressed to the 
Supreme Court in the parties’ petition for certiorari.14
In analyzing Cutter, Part II outlines the reasons Congress considered 
in passing RLUIPA. Part III reviews the legal developments that led to 
the passage of RLUIPA. Part IV then sketches the relevant factual 
scenario presented to the Cutter court including the case’s procedural 
history and the court’s holding. Following this background material Part 
V analyzes the court’s reasoning and concludes the court wrongly held 
that RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause. Specifically, it explains 
that although the court facially applied the Lemon v. Kurtzman test 
(“Lemon test”) in its Establishment Clause analysis, it improperly relied 
upon non-precedential factors in applying the Lemon test, used flawed 
reasoning, and wrongly dismissed RLUIPA’s jurisprudential support to 
hold that RLUIPA is unconstitutional.15 Part VI then addresses a few of 
RLUIPA’s potential problems by acknowledging the burdens it may 
place upon states’ penal systems. But it argues that such policy-based 
concerns are best addressed through the legislature rather than the courts. 
Finally, Part VII urges that upon review the Supreme Court should apply 
the Lemon test as applied in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos16 and Madison v. Riter17 to 
overturn the Sixth Circuit’s holding and uphold RLUIPA’s 
Establishment Clause constitutionality. 
 
II.  WHY RLUIPA, WHY NOW? 
 
By definition, incarceration entails some measure of control over the 
incarcerated. State institutions and specifically prisons, are highly 
regulated environments in which uniformity of schedule, appearance, and 
activity for purposes of security and economy are top priorities.18 Given 
 14. E.g. Brief for the United States at 9, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003), 
petition for certiorari filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3229 (No. 03-9877). 
 15. See generally Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 16. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 17. 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 18. Developments in the Law – The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1891 (2002) 
[hereinafter Developments]. 
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the control necessary to imprison and society’s general suspicion of 
prisoners’ motivations for religious activity, extensive limitations on 
religious expression during incarceration have long been tolerated.19 
Naturally, because of the United State’s traditional religious make-up, 
those religious expressions not conforming to the traditional Protestant 
mold have often been prohibited or severely limited.20 However, modern 
sensibilities are offended when religious liberties are restricted in 
“egregious and unnecessary ways” that yield little benefit to prison 
administrators’ goal of security. 21 Many of these offending restrictions 
result from a drive for efficiency seasoned with ignorance, lack of 
resources, and often, plain indifference.22 The effect of these restrictions 
has been exacerbated keenly since the 1960s with the dramatic 
proliferation of variety in religious preferences among inmates, a 
burgeoning prison population, and the resultant budgetary pressures on 
the penal system.23
After years of hearings receiving testimony of unwarranted 
restriction on religious practice in general and discrimination among 
religious practices in prisons, Congress determined that action was 
required.24 Congressional testimony described penal restrictions on 
religious activity that did not pose a threat to security or even efficiency. 
This testimony included accounts such as the following: Prohibiting a 
Catholic priest from bringing a small amount of sacramental wine into 
prison.25 Or, prison administrators’ refusal to purchase or accept donated 
matzo (the unleaved bread some Jews eat at Passover) from a Jewish 
organization.26 In addition, prior to RLUIPA prison administrators often 
refused to make selective accommodations for adherents of non-majority 
religions.27 For example, Muslim inmates were denied Islamic prayer oil 
even “though other kinds of fragrant body oils and lotions were made 
available to inmates.”28 Finally, Congress heard testimony of sectarian 
discrimination in the accommodations afforded prisoners, such as 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 1892. 
 21. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Senators 
Hatch and Kennedy). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Developments, supra note 18, at 1893. A prime example of change in the religious 
identity of prison populations was the dramatic rise of predominantly African-American male 
Muslims in prison during the 1960’s. Id. 
 24. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 3, Cutter (No. 03-
9877). 
 25. Id. at S7777. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 11-12, Cutter (No. 
03-9877). 
 28. Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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permitting the lighting of votive candles but not Chanukah candles.29 
Likewise, prison officials repeatedly refused to allow Jewish prisoners to 
miss meals on fast days or to obtain a sack lunch to breach their fast at 
nightfall.30 These examples were legally tolerated because prior to 
RLUIPA, administrators were permitted to enforce restrictions on 
religious freedoms if the restrictions were reasonably related to executing 
a valid penal interest—and quite often the administrators draped the 
restrictions in the previously fail proof rationale of security.31
 
A.  RLUIPA Effects 
 
RLUIPA was formulated to address prison regulations with respect 
to religious exercise that are “grounded on mere speculation, exaggerated 
fears, or post-hoc rationalizations” clothed generally in the name of 
security.32 However, heightened scrutiny, at least under RLUIPA’s 
predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), did not 
produce a particularly inmate friendly trend as judges continued to defer 
to the asserted penal interests of correctional administrators.33 Instead 
prison administrators have generally easily met RFRA’s and RLUIPA’s 
compelling interest prong and courts have not strictly enforced the least 
restrictive means requirement.34 Accordingly, some commentators claim 
that RLUIPA like RFRA has not changed the nature of inmate religious 
rights at all.35 However, unlike RFRA, RLUIPA defines religious 
exercise much more broadly so that it may be easier to initially advance a 
claim as religious and thus covered by RLUIPA.36
 29. See Protecting Religious Liberty After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
On the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 3, at 41 (1988) 
hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Isaac Jaroslawicz). Votive candles are used by Christians as part 
of a devotional worship whereas Chanukah candles are used by some Jews in worship. See 
http://ohr.edu/yhiy/article.php/1318 (last vistited Mar. 25, 2005). 
 30. See Hearing, supra note 29, at 43.   
 31. See Developments, supra note 18, at 1894 n.19 (reporting prison official testimony on 
how regulations have traditionally been characterized in terms of security in order to pass judicial 
scrutiny). 
 32. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 33. Developments, supra note 18, at 1894.   
 34. Id. Additional review of the effects of RLUIPA, regardless of its constitutionality, is 
warranted. At least one article questions whether RFRA and RLUIPA are simply restatements of the 
law established in Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) and 
thus are unnecessary and possibly will inhibit judicial discretion and creativity. See Sara Smolik, The 
Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was it a Waste? 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723 (2004) 
(discussing whether RLUIPA was really necessary).
 35. See Sara Smolik, The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was it a Waste? 31 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723 (2004).  
 36. Developments, supra note 18, at 1895.   
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III.  BACKGROUND: RELIGIOUS RIGHTS FRAMEWORK AND RLUIPA 
 
Section three of RLUIPA is a legislative enhancement of the 
protection afforded institutionalized persons’ religious expression 
beyond that guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.37 Instituting a strict 
standard of review for otherwise religious-neutral governmental actions 
that burden institutionalized individuals’ religious activity enhances 
protection. Although the Act is relatively new and specific to 
institutionalized persons, the quest of determining the standard of review 
required by the Free Exercise Clause, yet permitted by the Establishment 
Clause, long predates the Act’s passage. Thus RLUIPA, although rather 
unique in its application, is yet another effort at promulgating a general 
standard of review for governmental actions that impede upon individual 
religious expression; in so doing it attempts to safeguard individual 
religious freedoms while balancing concerns for impermissible 
governmental sponsorship of religion.38
 
A.  A Standard In Flux 
 
The Court’s modern Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence is a 
labyrinth of balancing and factor tests that have fluctuated in acceptance 
and use most notably since the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner. 39 In 
Sherbert, the Court, similar to Congress with RLUIPA, embraced a strict 
scrutiny test for analyzing all neutral government actions that 
substantially burden religious practice.40 This test provided that any 
otherwise neutral public law that burdens religious expression must be 
“in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and must be the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.”41
Although strict scrutiny was the test for Free Exercise Clause 
analysis, in practice the Court narrowly interpreted the Sherbert test. In 
effect the Court largely replaced strict scrutiny with a rational basis 
scrutiny test until it became the de facto Free Exercise Clause test for 
most situations.42 In contrast to strict scrutiny, this less intensive scrutiny 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2004). 
 38. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 39. See Anne Y. Chiu, Note & Comment, When Prisoners are Weary and Their Religious 
Exercise Burdened, RLUIPA Provides Some Rest for their Souls, 79 WASH. L. REV. 999, 1002-03 
(2004); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 40. 374 U.S. 398 (1963), overruled in part by Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. of Or. 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 41. Id. 
 42. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), superseded by statute. 
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test requires courts to consider: (1) if there is a “valid, rational 
connection” between a neutral law and a legitimate government interest; 
(2) if the burdened person has alternative means of exercising the right in 
question; (3) the impact of a requested accommodation upon 
governmental interests; and (4) the absence of alternatives to the law or 
regulation.43 The practice of narrowly applying the Sherbert test in favor 
of the rational basis test became the rule in Employment Division, 
Deparment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.44 In Smith, the 
Court explained that the Free Exercise Clause did not require strict 
scrutiny of neutral laws that incidentally burden religious expression 
except in limited situations.45 Instead the Court interpreted the Free 
Exercise Clause as only requiring the application of the rational basis 
test.46 However, it explained that the Establishment Clause did not 
prohibit the strict scrutiny standard and invited concerned legislatures to 
consider enhancing religious legal protections by adopting a stricter 
standard than constitutionally required.47
 
B.  RLUIPA: A Legislative Response 
 
Responding to Smith’s invitation and reacting to the widespread 
perception that Smith eviscerated Free Exercise protections, Congress 
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).48 Like 
RLUIPA, RFRA employed a strict scrutiny test but applied it to the 
states via the Fourteenth Amendment.49 However, principally because 
RFRA rested on the slender reed of the Fourteenth Amendment for 
applicability to states, the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores held that 
RFRA violated principles of federalism and thus was not applicable to 
states or their subdivisions.50 However, the constitutionality of its strict 
 43. See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987), superseded by statute (citing 
Block v. Rutherford, 468 US 576, 586 (1984)). 
 44. See 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), superseded by statute. Smith involved the constitutionality 
of an Oregon law that in effect criminalized the use of a hallucinogenic drug commonly called 
peyote unless prescribed by a medical practitioner. See id. at 874. The respondents used the drug as 
part of a sacramental right in the Native American Church. Their use of peyote resulted in dismissal 
from their jobs and refusal of unemployment benefits from the state. Id. In holding that Oregon’s law 
was constitutional, the case became significant for redefining the scrutiny level for Court’s review of 
the constitutionality of otherwise neutral laws that impede religious expression. Id. 
 45. See id. at 880-87 (allowing strict scrutiny to apply to laws that burden the Free Exercise 
Clause in conjunction with other constitutionally protected rights. For example, when more than one 
constitutionally protected right was involved, a higher level of scrutiny was permissible.). 
 46. See id. at 885-87. 
 47. Id. at 890. 
 48. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997), superseded by statute. 
 49. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 260 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 50. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511. 
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scrutiny standard was not specifically addressed; consequently, RFRA 
and its strict scrutiny standard continue to be applicable on a Federal 
level.51 Despite RFRA’s failure Congress was still eager to curtail what it 
perceived as widespread state and local governmental action that 
impinged individuals’ freedom of religious exercise. Congress responded 
to Boerne with RLUIPA.52 Anxious to avoid another confrontation with 
the Court, the Act’s co-sponsors, Senators Hatch and Kennedy, 
attempted to answer the Court’s Federalism concerns set forth in Boerne 
by bypassing the 14th Amendment and limiting RLUIPA’s scope.53 
Accordingly, the Act applies to states under the Spending and Commerce 
Clauses and is limited to zoning and institutional settings.54 Specifically, 
it uses the Spending and Commerce Clauses to apply to state’s actions 
affecting zoning and institutional settings that receive Federal financial 
assistance or where the substantial burden on religion affects or its 
removal would affect commerce among the states, with foreign nations, 
or with Indian tribes.55 In regard to its institutional application, the 
positive requirements and limitations of the pertinent portion of 
RLUIPA, section three, are as follows: 
 
Protection of religious exercise of institutionalized persons 
 
(a) General rule. No government shall impose a substantial burden on 
the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 
institution, . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of 
the burden on that person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
 
(b) Scope of application. This section applies in any case in which— 
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that 
receives Federal financial assistance; or 
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial 
 51. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 260; Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (holding that RFRA is unconstitutional 
as applied to states because Congress exceeded its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment because 
it went beyond Fifth Amendment power to prevent abuse of religious rights to impermissibly 
defining those rights). 
 52. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 53. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 260. 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2004). 
 55. Id. 
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burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among  the 
several States, or with Indian tribes.56
 
To increase the likelihood of enforcement, RLUIPA provides for 
both a governmental and a private right of action.57 Yet, given the need 
for order and safety in institutionalized settings, the Act’s sponsors 
sought prudential limitations to enforcement of truly egregious or 
otherwise unjustified instances of religious burdening.58 This desire is 
primarily expressed through RLUIPA’s internal limitations such as 
permitting a law to burden religious expression if it serves a compelling 
governmental interest that may not be carried out in a less restrictive 
manner.59 In addition, Senators Hatch and Kennedy sought self-imposed 
judicial limitations by cautioning courts enforcing RLUIPA to continue 
giving deference to institutional administrators’ regulations given the 
considerations of security, discipline, and cost inherent to institutions.60 
Considering the enumerated precautions Congress took in ensuring 
RLUIPA’s constitutionality, it is not surprising that a number of courts 
considering challenges to RLUIPA have determined it is constitutional.61
This context makes the Sixth Circuit’s lone opposition to RLUIPA in 
Cutter all the more unusual and deserving of judicial review. Although 
the Cutter court originally drew support for its holding from two district 
court decisions in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, both decisions have 
subsequently been overruled by their respective circuits.62 Thus, two 
circuits have come to the exact opposite conclusion regarding RLUIPA’s 
First Amendment constitutionality, and similarly, at least five circuits 
have concluded that the identical operative language in RFRA does not 
violate the Establishment Clause.63
 
IV.  FACTS: CUTTER V. WILKINSON 
 
Cutter v. Wilkinson is a compilation of three trial court cases in 
which inmates challenged several Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Corrections (“ODRC”) decisions that they claimed violated RLUIPA by 
 56. Id. 
 57. § 2000cc-2(a). Note that plaintiffs in Cutter were able to sue state officials in federal 
court under the fiction of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 58. CONG. REC. S7774-01,S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and 
Sen. Kennedy). 
 59. Id. at S7774. 
 60. Id. at S7775. 
 61. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 261-62 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 62. Id. at 257, 262. 
 63. Id. at 257, 261-62. 
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denying their various requests for religious accommodations.64 Although 
their claims are interesting, the facts of the individual cases are not 
particularly relevant.65 The common issue that is relevant to the 
consolidation of these three cases is Ohio’s challenge to RLUIPA’s 
constitutionality.66
 
A.  Procedural History: Cutter v. Wilkinson 
 
Prior to consolidation of the three cases the individual plaintiffs 
initially brought claims against ODRC officials under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.67 While the individual cases were pending, 
Congress passed RLUIPA and the plaintiffs amended their complaints to 
include claims under the Act.68 The defendants responded with motions 
to dismiss the RLUIPA claims, arguing that RLUIPA is unconstitutional 
because it violates the Establishment Clause and exceeds Congress’s 
Spending and Commerce Clause powers in its application to states.69 The 
United States intervened in the district court to defend RLUIPA’s 
constitutionality, and the cases were consolidated to decide the motions 
to dismiss.70 The motions were referred to a magistrate judge who 
concluded that RLUIPA was constitutional and recommended the 
motions be denied.71 The district court adopted the Magistrate’s 
reasoning and recommendation and denied the motions, whereupon the 
state of Ohio was granted leave to make an interlocutory appeal to the 
Sixth Circuit.74 The Sixth Circuit accepted Ohio’s appeal and responded 
by reversing the district court; it held that section three of RLUIPA 
violates the Establishment Clause.75 The United States and various 
 64. Id. at 260. 
 65. Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833-34 (S.D. Ohio 2002). The inmates claims 
involved what may be characterized as non-traditional religious requests such as delivery of white 
supremacist literature. Id. 
 66. See generally Cutter, 349 F.3d at 260. 
 67. Memorandum in Support of the Plaintiff-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing and 
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-
3270, 02-3299, 02-3301). 
 68. Id. at 2-3. 
 69. Brief in Response to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for the United States in the Supreme 
Court of the United States at 5, Cutter (No. 03-9877). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Petitions of United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at 4, Cutter (No. 02-3270, 02-3299, 02-3301). 
 72. Brief for Appellants at 23-25, Cutter (No. 03-9877). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 261, 268-69 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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Amicus Curiae in response petitioned the circuit court for a rehearing.76 
The Sixth Circuit denied the petition and the petitioners, joined by the 
defendants, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.77 
On October 12, 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the parties 
on the issue of RLUIPA’s section three constitutionality and 
subsequently scheduled oral arguments for April 19, 2005.78
 
V.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Establishment Clause of the Constitution states, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”79 The Free 
Exercise clause instructs that Congress shall not make a law “prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof.”80 The Supreme Court has interpreted these 
juxtaposed clauses to collectively require that laws be religiously neutral 
as a fundamental aspect of the First Amendment.81 Although such an 
interpretation may seem reasonable, what neutrality means in concrete 
terms leads to distinct differences of opinion.82 For example, neutrality 
may mean that government may not support a particular religious sect 
but may support religion in general.83 Or, conversely, neutrality may 
mean that laws may not assist religion directly or indirectly.84 In short, 
neutrality is not self-defining. 
To give guidance to the judiciary as to a definition of neutrality, at 
least in relation to the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court 
enunciated the well-known Lemon test.85 The Lemon test provides that in 
order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation a law must meet the 
following three criteria: a statute (1) “must have a secular legislative 
purpose,” (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) it must not create “excessive 
government entanglement with religion.”86 The Lemon test fails, 
however, to render any guidance in relation to the Free Exercise Clause. 
 76. E.g. Petitions of United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Cutter (No. 02-3270, 02-3299, 02-3301). 
 77. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 4294 (Mar. 3, 2004), Brief in Response to 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for the United States in the Supreme Court of the United States at 7, 
Cutter (No. 03-9877). 
 78. Cutter, 349 F.3d 257, cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3229.  
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
 82. E.g. Cutter, 349 F.3d 257. 
 83. Contra Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.  
 84. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 85. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.  
 86. Id. at 612-13. 
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Instead, Free Exercise Clause analysis after Smith and until RFRA and 
RLUIPA was analyzed under the judicially created rational relationship 
test.87
To determine if RLUIPA’s standard of strict scrutiny violated the 
Establishment Clause the Cutter court used the Lemon test as a 
framework for its analysis.88 Under the test’s purpose prong, the court 
conceded that RLUIPA might be permissible, although it expends 
considerable space reasoning otherwise.89 Similarly the court determined 
that RLUIPA does not violate the entanglement prong.90 However, the 
court held that RLUIPA clearly violates the effect prong and is thus 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.91
 
A.  Purpose Prong 
 
The Lemon test’s purpose prong requires that a law have a “secular 
legislative purpose.”92 In defining this requirement the Cutter court relied 
on reasoning outlined in Edwards v. Aguillard to articulate the test for a 
secular legislative purpose as asking whether the “government’s actual 
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.”93 The court inferred the 
governmental purpose based upon the law’s effects on religious rights as 
compared to other constitutionally protected rights.94 If governmental 
action offered additional protection to religious rights without similarly 
protecting other constitutionally protected rights, the court reasoned that 
such action had the impermissible purpose of endorsing religion.95  
However, this so-called lockstep requirement was rejected in Amos.96 In 
Amos the Court stated that it is a permitted governmental purpose “to 
alleviate significant governmental interference” with religious expression 
even without similarly affecting other constitutionally protected rights.97 
So, although Congress does not have a constitutional duty to remove or 
mitigate burdens on religious exercise, it is not forbidden from removing 
such burdens.98 Accordingly, the plaintiffs in this case claim that 
 87. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 88. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 89. See id. at 264. 
 90. Id. at 267-68. 
91.   Id. 
 92. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
 93. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987)).  
 94. Id. at 264. 
 95. Id. at 262-64. 
 96. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987). 
 97. See id. at 335. 
 98. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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RLUIPA, via the strict scrutiny test, does exactly what Amos said is a 
permissible purpose: alleviate significant governmental burdens on 
religious exercise, albeit in an institutional setting.99
 
1.  The Amos decision 
 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos considered the dismissal of various employees 
from nonprofit facilities owned and organized as corporations controlled 
by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“Church”).100 The 
employees were discharged for failing to meet certain religious 
requirements of the Church.101 The disgruntled former employees sued 
the Church under § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Utah’s District 
Court claiming they were impermissibly dismissed due to religious 
discrimination.102 The Church replied that it was exempt from the 
prohibition against religious discrimination in employment by § 702 of 
that Act.103 Section 702 provides that religious employers may be 
permissibly exempt from the prohibition on religious discrimination in 
employment.104 However, the district court held that the § 702 exemption 
did not apply and furthermore that § 702 violated the effects prong of the 
Lemon test and thus was unconstitutional.105 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reversed. Using the Lemon test, the Court determined that 
government may—and at times must—accommodate religious 
practices.106 Furthermore, the Court held that the Church acted properly 
in dismissing the employees because the Church’s actions were covered 
by the religion exemption in § 702.107
The Court held that the § 702 exemption satisfied the Lemon test in 
the following ways. First, under the purpose prong the Court reasoned 
that although not required by the Free Exercise Clause it is a permissible 
legislative purpose to alleviate significant government interference with 
the ability of religious organizations to carry out their religious 
missions.108 Second, under the effects prong the Court determined that § 
 99. Brief for Appellants at 24, Cutter (No. 02-3270). 
 100. Amos, 483 U.S. at 330. The referenced church is often referred to by the moniker 
“Mormon” although it does not officially recognize that appellation. 
 101. Id. Eligibility to attend temples is premised upon compliance with Church requirements 
such as meeting attendance and abstinence from alcohol and tobacco use. 
 102. Id. at 331. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2004). 
 105. Amos, 483 U.S. at 331-33. 
 106. Id. at 334-40. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 335. 
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702 is not unconstitutional because it allows religious organizations to 
advance their legal and stated purpose: promoting religion without 
simultaneously enhancing protection of other constitutional freedoms.109 
Instead, to violate the effects prong, the Court explained that government 
itself would have to advance religion through financial support or active 
involvement and not simply by removing governmental burdens upon 
religious activities.110 Finally, the Court explained that instead of 
entangling church and state § 702 aided in separating the two by 
avoiding governmental inquiry into religious belief to determine if a 
particular job is truly religiously connected.111
 
2.  Differentiating Amos 
 
Apparently recognizing the threat Amos posed to their decision, the 
Cutter court attempted to differentiate Amos. It attempted to do so by 
emphasizing the factual difference in Amos and Cutter. Namely that § 
702 in Amos was necessary to alleviate possible Establishment Clause 
violations, whereas RLUIPA elevated religious rights protection above 
an already constitutionally acceptable level.112 Furthermore, the court 
claimed that RLUIPA is much larger in scope than the Amos § 702 
exception, thus casting Amos as a narrow exception to the general rule.113 
In so doing the court failed to adequately distinguish Amos so as to make 
its reasoning inapplicable. 
For example, initially the Cutter court focused on the Supreme 
Court’s characterization of § 702 in Amos as necessary to avoid a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.114 In contrast, the court explained 
that RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard was not necessary to avoid 
violating the Establishment Clause since the Court in Smith had 
previously established the rational relationship test as adequate for 
Establishment Clause analysis.115 The Cutter court concluded that 
because RLUIPA was not necessary to avoid an Establishment Clause 
violation, Amos is distinguishable and its reasoning is not applicable to 
this case.116 The reasoning underpinning this conclusion, however, is 
fundamentally flawed in at least two ways. 
First, like Cutter, the Amos Court applied the Lemon test in 
 109. Id. at 337-39. 
 110. Id. at 337 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). 
 111. Id. at 339. 
 112. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 263. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 263-64. 
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evaluating a law’s constitutionality in relation to the Establishment 
Clause.117 Although ostensibly differing motivations underlie the subject 
statutes in Amos and Cutter, the Court’s Lemon test reasoning is none-
the-less generally applicable to an analysis of RLUIPA or any other 
law’s constitutionality under the Establishment Clause.118 Thus, differing 
statutes do not warrant individualized purpose prong tests. This 
conclusion is supported by the widespread use of the Amos Court’s 
reasoning by a number of courts analyzing the strict scrutiny test 
embodied in RFRA and RLUIPA.119
Second, and more importantly, in concluding that Amos was not 
applicable because RLUIPA was not necessary to avoid an 
Establishment Clause violation, the court appears to treat the standard of 
review for Free Exercise Clause analysis as a relevant test for 
Establishment Clause analysis. This is flawed. As mentioned above, the 
court reasoned that RLUIPA was not necessary to avoid a violation of 
the Establishment Clause.120 While this may be a valid conclusion, the 
court errs in its explanation of why RLUIPA was not necessary to avoid 
an Establishment Clause violation: Because the Supreme Court had 
already approved rational relationship review for laws that interfered 
with prisoners’ fundamental rights, RLUIPA’s heightened standard was 
unnecessary.121 Again, this too is a correct statement, although it should 
be noted that just because a standard is unnecessary does not make it 
impermissible. Regardless, the relevant error in reasoning here is 
concluding that the already established rational relationship standard 
somehow prevented Establishment Clause violations. This is simply 
incorrect—the referenced standards of review pertain to Free Exercise 
clause and not Establishment Clause analysis.122 Although the court had 
held that the rational relationship standard did not violate the 
Establishment Clause, its principle purpose was to establish a floor for 
analysis of Free Exercise Clause analysis. The afore-referenced Lemon 
test is the applicable Establishment Clause test. Thus, comparison of the 
purposes of the underlying statutes at issue in Amos and Cutter is, as 
ironically noted by a RLUIPA critic, “like comparing apples and 
oranges” and misses the point that the shared and relevant analysis 
between the two cases is their application of the Lemon test.123
 117. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-39; Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262-66. 
 118. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-39 (suggesting that the Lemon test is the generally applicable 
test for Establishment Clause analysis). 
 119. E.g. Madison v. Riter 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 120. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263. 
 121. Id. at 263-66.  
 122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000). 
 123. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 268 (citing Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration 
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3.  Purpose prong and RLUIPA’s scope 
 
In addition to the misplaced comparison of the purposes of the 
subject statutes in Amos and Cutter, the court claims that Amos is further 
distinguishable because RLUIPA is much larger in scope than the 
exception in Amos.124 The court uses the issue of scope by suggesting 
RLUIPA has an impermissible purpose due to and evidenced by its 
broader sweep.125 For example, it explains that unlike the exemption in 
Amos, RLUIPA does not remove a narrow obstacle to religious exercise 
but rather applies to any number of present and future governmental 
regulations.126 Although the court stops short of declaring Congress 
disingenuous in stating that its purpose was accommodating religion by 
needlessly removing unnecessary obstacles, it implies that RLUIPA’s 
effectual purpose is not the required secular purpose of protecting 
religious expression under the Free Exercise clause.127 Instead the court 
determines that RLUIPA’s purpose is to advance religion in institutional 
settings.128
The crux of this reasoning is that RLUIPA has in effect a prohibited 
purpose imputed by the Act’s protection of religious freedoms without 
simultaneously affording protection to other constitutionally protected 
conduct.129 Yet, the reasoning that RLUIPA does not protect 
constitutional freedoms in a lockstep fashion seems to be a fault of too 
narrow a sweep rather than too broad.130 Regardless, the perceived failure 
to simultaneously protect constitutionally protected forms of conduct is 
not a controlling constitutional test.131 Instead this test appears to be 
based on Justice Steven’s dicta in a concurring opinion that neutrality 
dictates that governmental actions may not tend to favor religion over 
irreligion.132 While perhaps persuasive to the court, it is not controlling—
Amos is. In an apparent recognition of its weakness in distinguishing 
Amos and in using non-precedential factors to evaluate RLUIPA under 
the purpose prong, the court ends its purpose prong analysis abruptly by 
explaining that even if RLUIPA has a permissible purpose under Amos it 
Act is Unconstitutional, 1 U.  PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 13-14. (1998)). 
 124. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263-64. 
 125. Id. at 263-64. 
 126. See id. at 264. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 264-65 
 130. See id. 
 131. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987). 
 132. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37; Amos, 483 U.S. at 327, 337 (1987). 
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nevertheless fails the effects prong.133
 
B.  Effects Prong 
 
Because the court at least entertains the idea that RLUIPA has a 
permissible purpose and concludes that RLUIPA does not violate the 
entanglement prong, the court’s holding rests on its effects prong 
analysis.134 The court concludes that RLUIPA has the impermissible 
effect of inducing institutionalized persons to religious activity by 
relying on a pre-Amos test of the effects prong.135 This old test asks 
whether the law or practice under review “conveys a message of 
endorsement or disapproval” as evidenced by protecting religious rights 
without similarly advancing other constitutional rights.136 This again is a 
reiteration of the so-called lockstep rule.137 In evaluating Cutter for 
impermissible effects under this lockstep rule, the court relied on the 
Ghashiyah court’s two factor test to determine whether RLUIPA 
conveys a message of governmental endorsement of religion by 
protecting religious rights without similarly enhancing protection of 
other constitutional rights.138 These two factors are (1) whether the 
governmental action benefits both secular and religious entities, and (2) 
whether the action will induce rather than merely protect religious 
exercise.139 Under both factors the court essentially considers the same 
aspects of RLUIPA but asks different questions.140
In its discussion of the first Ghashiyah factor, the Cutter court 
analyzed whether the governmental action benefits both secular and 
religious entities in tandem—again, the lockstep rule.141 Similar to the 
court’s conclusion under its purpose prong analysis, the court concluded 
under this factor that RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard fails to 
simultaneously advance secular and religious freedoms.142 Thus, the 
court reasoned that RLUIPA has the effect of sending a message of 
governmental endorsement of religion.143 In support of this conclusion 
 133. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264. 
 134. Id. at 264-68. 
 135. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264 (citing Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93; See infra text accompanying note 138. 
 138. Cutter, 349 F.3d  at 264 (citing Ghashiyah v. Dept. of Corr. of the State of Wis., 250 F. 
Supp. 2d  1016, 1025 -26 (E.D. Wis. 2003), overruled by Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 264-67. 
 141. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 267. 
 142. Id. at 265-67. 
 143. Id. 
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the court largely relied on a district court’s assessment in Madison v. 
Riter that RLUIPA switches the burden of proof from an inmate to prison 
officials.144 After citing numerous examples of how this represents a 
change from the status quo the court summed up its estimation of the 
effect of this change by again citing Madison: “it is hard to imagine a 
greater reversal of fortunes for the religious rights of inmates than the 
one involved in . . . RLUIPA” without any corresponding secular 
benefit.145 Despite this reversal of prisoners’ fortunes, the court does not 
indicate how the enhanced standard is unconstitutional or otherwise 
illegal.146 Instead it attempts to present the appearance of an Act that has 
so drastically changed the balance of religious to secular rights so as to 
unquestionably establish an endorsement of religion by the state.147
Regardless of the change in the balance of protection for religious 
and other constitutional rights, this lockstep rule is simply not a 
controlling Establishment Clause or effects prong test.148 Instead, this test 
appears to be derived from a concurring opinion by Justice Stevens 
reasoning that government may not support religion over irreligion.149 As 
a derivative of Justice Stevens’ reasoning comes the notion that religious 
rights may not be granted greater protection than other constitutionally 
guaranteed rights unless there is some identifiable need for greater 
protection.150 Therefore, this test is not derived from controlling common 
or statutory law and was clearly rejected by the Amos court.151 However, 
assuming that this is a valid requirement, RLUIPA does not enhance 
religious rights protection to an extent that induces institutionalized 
persons to practice religion.152 Furthermore, under the second Ghashiyah 
factor—at least in institutional settings—there is arguably an identifiable 
need for greater protection of religious freedoms. 
For example, in regard to the court’s claim that RLUIPA’s 
enhancement of protections for religious rights induces persons to 
practice religion, the court explains that under strict scrutiny prison 
officials bear the burden of proof instead of the plaintiff prisoners.153 Yet, 
 144. Id. at 265 (citing Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 575 (W.D. Va. 2003), overruled 
by Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See generally id. at 266. 
 148. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 149. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997). 
 150. See id. 
 151. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987); Cutter, 349 F. 3d at 264 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
690 (1984)). 
 152. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 153. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265-67. 
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it fails to mention that prior to the prison officials bearing the burden of 
proof a claimant must first offer prima facie evidence of a violation of 
the Free Exercise Clause.154 Regarding this point, Senator Hatch 
explained that the “party asserting a violation of this Act shall in all cases 
bear the burden of proof that the governmental action in question 
constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise.”155 Furthermore, if 
the government provides prima facie evidence that it has offered to make 
an accommodation to relieve the substantial burden the claimant then has 
the burden to show that the proposed accommodation is unreasonable or 
ineffective in relieving the burden.156 Both Senators Hatch and Kennedy 
expected the courts to continue to give deference to the experience of 
prison administrators in establishing regulations necessary to maintain 
security.157 They believed, however, that the Act’s enhancement of the 
burden of proof on the government would assist prisoners in challenging 
regulations based on mere speculation or justified by post-hoc 
rationalizations.158 Thus, although the lockstep rule is not controlling, 
even if it is an applicable test, the court fails to show that strict scrutiny 
shifts the burden of proof such that religious rights are granted excessive 
protection resulting in the impermissible effect of government inducing 
institutionalized persons’ religious activity. 
The second Ghashiyah factor asks if the Act will induce rather than 
simply protect religious exercise.159 Under this factor the court 
determined that RLUIPA has the effect of encouraging prisoners to be 
religious in order to enjoy greater rights and thus fails to satisfy this 
factor.160 In doing so, the court relies upon its own circuit court test that 
asks “whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative 
history, and implementation of the enactment would view it as state 
endorsement of religion.”161 However, this circuit court test was derived 
from Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, in which the Supreme Court 
considered a statute’s effect on nonreligious persons as part of an effect 
analysis. But it did so in the context of government compelling non-
adherents to support religious practice as opposed to a possible 
enticement to do so.162 Thus, the case is factually dissimilar from Cutter 
 154. Id. at 265; 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of 
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 155. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at S7775. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264. 
 160. Id. at 266. 
 161. Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 484 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 162. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 267. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989). This 
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and the rule is not applicable in this context. 
Yet, like the first factor, even if the second factor is applicable 
RLUIPA is in compliance. For example, the court reasons that RLUIPA 
will allow religious adherents special rights, and as a result, other 
prisoners will feel compelled to become religious in order to enjoy 
similar benefits.163 This implies that RLUIPA will somehow prevent 
substantive prison rules from applying with equal force to the religious 
and irreligious. This is not correct. As noted earlier, Senators Hatch and 
Kennedy both stated on the record that they expected courts to continue 
to give deference to prison administrators in terms of rules of safety and 
order.164 In addition, even if RLUIPA does grant religious activity greater 
protections than other activities, it is hard to imagine that the so-called 
extra freedoms that will accrue to religious activity will be a substantive 
attraction to the irreligious. RLUIPA’s legislative history illustrates this 
point. The history cites as evidence of the need for RLUIPA instances of 
prison authorities surreptitiously recording the confession of a prisoner to 
his priest and an instance where a prisoner was permitted to attend a 
religious service but forbidden to take communion.165 If RLUIPA allows 
prisoners to confess in private or partake of communion it is difficult to 
imagine similarly permissible freedoms enticing a large or even a 
minimal number of non-religious prisoners to profess religious 
adherence. 
Likewise, because the strict scrutiny test is self-limiting, the 
government will have ample opportunity to prevent the accrual of 
generally attractive rights that are otherwise disruptive to an institutional 
setting. The test is self-limiting by allowing the government an 
opportunity to establish regulations that burden religion provided it can 
establish a compelling governmental interest and show that the goal of 
the regulation is accomplished by the least restrictive means.166 
Combined with Senator Hatch’s admonitions to courts to give deference 
to prison administrators’ expertise, such a test allows prison officials to 
continue to limit any religious expression that will otherwise threaten 
case considered a statute’s effect on nonreligious persons as part of the effect analysis. However, it is 
only a plurality opinion and simply held that the government may not compel non-adherents to 
support religious practices. The question then remains as to the court’s contention that failure to 
protect other constitutional rights in lockstep with religious rights de facto compels non-adherents to 
support religious practices. 
 163. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 266. 
 164. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 165. Id. 
 166. CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and 
Sen. Kennedy). 
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safety and order.167 This deduction is supported by empirical evidence 
gathered under RFRA.168 This evidence, complied by the Department of 
Justice, demonstrated that RFRA’s strict scrutiny requirement had not 
been an unreasonable burden to the Federal prison system.169 For 
example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons experienced only sixty-five 
RFRA suits during RFRA’s six-year life, and the Justice Department 
points out that most of those alleged other legal theories and thus would 
have been filed anyway.170
In summary, as in its purpose prong analysis, in its effects prong 
analysis the Cutter court relied on an improper differentiation of Amos, 
which resulted in its use of non-controlling tests, flawed reasoning, and 
an incorrect determination that RLUIPA has impermissible effects. 
 
C.  Entanglement Prong 
 
Under the final Lemon prong, entanglement, the court must 
determine whether RLUIPA results in an excessive entanglement of 
government and religion.171 The court appropriately rejects Ghashiyah’s 
overzealous analysis and recognizes that RLUIPA does not require any 
greater interaction between government officials and religion than 
existed under the rational relationship standard.172 Indeed, the court 
appears to acquiesce to the fact enunciated in Amos that government, 
under current jurisprudence, is able to legislate regarding religion and 
must to some degree be entangled with it.173 Thus, it is not a matter of 
whether government may be involved with religion but to what degree it 
is involved.174 Because RLUIPA does not promote any greater 
government involvement than permissibly existed previously it does not 
violate this prong. 
 
 
 167. Id. at S7775. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.  A study of RFRA cases showed that of the inmate religious claims that reached trial, 
only nine percent were successful. Developments in the Law – The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 1838, 1894 (2002). Apparently, administrators easily met RFRA’s (now RLUIPA’s) 
compelling interest prong while courts generally ignored the least restrictive means requirement. Id. 
Furthermore, in connection with RFRA’s passage and applicable to RLUIPA, the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act was passed, requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing suit 
under any federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). 
 171. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
 172. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 173. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35, 338 (1987). 
 174. Id. 
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D.  Note on RLUIPA’s Jurisprudential Foundation 
 
Although the Supreme Court in Smith held that a rational 
relationship was the only test required by the Free Exercise Clause, the 
Court recognized it as the floor and not the ceiling of legislatively 
available Free Exercise requirements.175 Accordingly, the Smith Court 
invited legislatures concerned with Free Exercise limitations to increase 
available protection as RLUIPA attempts to do.176 Although the Act does 
change the burden of proof, the change is not so drastic as to do what this 
court implies: make the burden on the government so high as to send a 
message of governmental endorsement of religion and overstep Smith’s 
invitation to increase Free Exercise protections.177 Instead, with the strict 
scrutiny standard, RLUIPA—legislatively and according to Smith—
permissively elevates Free Exercise analysis above the constitutionally 
mandated base rational relationship standard without penetrating the 
Establishment Clause’s ceiling.178
 
VI.  RLUIPA’s WEAKNESSES: NOT A JUDICIAL PROBLEM 
 
Despite RLUIPA’s probable constitutionality, it is not necessarily 
effective or appropriate legislation. In fact, although the Justice 
Department and Senators Hatch and Kennedy claim that RFRA has not 
and RLUIPA will not significantly increase the burden on state 
institutional administrators, state administrators strongly claim 
otherwise.179 These interested parties render an impassioned pleading 
against RLUIPA on account of the burdens that they claim it imposes as 
evidenced by their experience under RFRA.180 Such burdens include 
complicating the task of “combating gangs” or diverting resources to 
responding to requests for special religious accommodations.181 These 
appear to be valid concerns that give one pause when considering the 
wisdom of RLUIPA in an institutional setting. However, Ohio’s 
experience with RLUIPA may not be representative of most states. As 
the defendants in Cutter recognized, the problems they experienced 
under RFRA’s strict scrutiny test may be unique to them because Ohio 
has a greater problem with white supremacist groups than most other 
 175. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 449 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265. 
 178. See Smith, 449 U.S. at 890. 
 179. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Senators Hatch 
and Kennedy); Defendant-Appellants’ Final Opening Brief at 1-2 & 9-10, Cutter (No. 02-3270). 
 180. Defendant-Appellants’ Final Opening Brief at 1-2, Cutter (No. 02-3270). 
 181. Id. 
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states.182 Such inmate groups are the largest and most sophisticated in 
Ohio’s correctional system and presumably the most active in invoking 
the protection of RFRA.183 In their effort to avoid these burdens, 
appellants ought to direct such policy-based arguments to Congress and 
save the courts for adjudication, not legislation.184 Although the courts 
must determine the constitutionality of the law, Congress is best suited to 
hear and act based on policy concerns.185
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
RLUIPA is certainly not a perfect law in the eyes of supporters who 
wish for it to be applied more broadly, nor of detractors who, among 
other things, consider it overtly burdensome.186 However, it is 
constitutional. This court makes an admirable effort to rationalize its 
holding but instead should have followed the controlling reasoning of 
Amos to hold for RLUIPA’s constitutionality. Upon review of this 
decision, the Supreme Court should utilize the Lemon test as explained in 
Amos. In so doing, the Court may find it helpful to consider the excellent 
application of Amos reasoning to RLUIPA as found in Madison v. 
Riter187 and leave further policy or political arguments regarding 
RLUIPA to Congress. 
 
James B. McMullin 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 14-16, Cutter  (No. 02-3270). 
 184. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47 & 48 (James Madison) (quoting Baron de Montesquieu 
who stated, “‘there can be no liberty . . . if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative 
and executive powers’”). 
 185. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (holding that legislatures, or in this case agencies, by virtue of their delegated authority, are 
better positioned than courts to analyze competing policy arguments when Congress has not directly 
spoken to the issue). 
 186. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and 
Sen. Kennedy); Defendant-Appellants’ Final Opening Brief at 1-2, Cutter (No. 02-3270). 
 187. 355 F.3d 310 (2003). 
